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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS BRIEF 
The following terms and abbreviations are used in 
this brief from time to time: 
1. Creasey Catering Company, Creasey Catering, Inc., 
Petitioner--"Creasey". 
2. Donald M. Steed, Claimant, Respondent "Steed11. 
3. Administrative Law Judge "ALJ". 
4. Lessee-Drivers, Lessee's, Claimed Independent 
contractor operator-drivers "Lessees". 
(iii) 
Mr. Dee Drollinger "Drollinger". 
Mr. Melvin Bowles "Bowles". 
Mr. Scott McDermaid "McDermaid". 
Mr. Terry Littlefield "Littlefield". 
Candy, Sandwiches, Coffee, Drinks, Pastry 
Cigarettes, and other items sold from the 
Creasey Catering trucks "Product". 
(iv) 
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Petitioner, , 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW, THE ] 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ) 
UTAH, and DONALD M. STEED, ) 
Respondents. 
1 No. 880092-CA 
#6 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is based upon 
Utah Code Ann 63-46b-16 and Rule 14, Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
The Nature of the Proceedings below were that the 
Respondent, Donald M. Steed, filed an application for 
unemployment benefits claiming that he had been an employee 
of Creasey, which application was denied by the Department of 
Unemployment Security, State of Utah. 
Upon appeal by Steed and after a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge, Judge Shonnie B. Passey, Department 
of Employment Security, the decision denying benefits was 
sustained and a decision was entered by Administrative Law 
Judge Kenneth A. Major denying benefits. 
Upon appeal to the Board of Review of the Industrial 
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Commission by Steed, the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge was reversed, the Board of Review ruling that Steed was 
paid a wage and thus was an employee of Creasey and therefore 
entitled to unemployment benefits. From this decision Creasey 
timely filed a Petition for Review to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW 
1. Did the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission erroneously interpret or apply the law applicable 
to when a person is an independent contractor or is an 
employee under applicable laws of the State of Utah relating 
to unemployment compensation? 
2. Did the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission enter its order reversing the Administrative Law 
Judge!s decision that Steed was an independent contractor, 
based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
Board of Review, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
board? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set forth in this section of the brief are 
general in nature and additional specific facts are cited with 
references to the record throughout the entire brief. 
1. Steed, went to work at Creasey about 1968 in 
answer to a newspaper ad, (R-85) as a Lessee of a catering 
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truck, selling food products, (Finding of Fact, ALJ, R-311) 
2. He entered into a written lease and License 
Agreement with Creasey whereby he leased a truck from Creasey 
and was assigned a route to sell products to customers at 
various businesses along the assigned route. Under the 
License Agreement he was permitted to use the name "Creasey 
Catering11 on the side of the leased vehicle. (R-37, Ex-10, 
Findings of Fact, ALJ 311) 
3. This lease was extended and modified from time 
to time upon agreement of the parties. (R-44, Ex 10) 
4. Under these written agreements with Creasey, 
Steed paid vehicle lease rentals based upon an agreed upon 
percentage of purchases of product from Creasey, or in the 
event that Steed purchased product from someone else, the 
same percentage was paid to Creasey based upon the purchase 
price paid by Steed to purchase such product from outside 
sources. (R-98, Findings fo Fact, ALJ, R-312) In 1985 the 
vehicle lease rentals paid by Steed were $10,744.00. (R-127) 
5. Steed could sell the product for such price as 
he wanted (R-112, as could others. (R-171) He had the right 
to raise or lower the prices from a suggested price list that 
Creasey furnished. He had the right to solicit new customers, 
as did the other vehicle lessees, and did so. (R-162) He had 
the right, and did in fact, sell on credit to his customers, 
(R-132) as did other lessees. (R-177) Any losses occasioned 
by giving credit was borne solely by Steed, (R-133) or the 
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other Lessees giving credit. (R-178) 
6. The method of operation used by Creasey and 
the Lessees was that the leased truck would be loaded by the 
Lessees with an inventory of pop, drinks, candy and other 
non-perishable product the night before, and in the morning 
the Lessees would purchase perishable sandwiches, cakes, 
cookies, pastries and other products from Creasey and then 
service their route. They would drive from business to 
business, arriving at an approximate scheduled time worked out 
with the various businesses and sell product to customers who 
were employees of the various businesses. Customers came out 
to the truck, which would pull into the parking lot of the 
business or park out on the street. 
7. Steed had at one time as many as 40 stops a day 
on his route (R-138) which varied from time to time, but he 
could drop stops if he wanted (R-139), add others (Findings of 
Fact, ALJ-R-312) and had the right to solicit new business 
(R-162). 
8. The product on the truck was the sole property 
of the Lessee. (R-131-132, Findings of Fact, ALJ-R-312) In 
1985 Steed purchased $80,720.00 in product, which he sold for 
$98,720 (R-126), evidently electing not to follow Creasey's 
37% suggested mark-up which would have generated additional 
sales income of $11,866.00 than that reported according to his 
tax return for that year. The risk of loss was that 
exclusively of the Lessee. Creasey did not take anything 
-4-
back. (R-132, Findings of Fact ALJ, R-312, 293) 
9. Usually at noon the Lessee would telephone 
Creasey's office and would be advised of the amount of 
money that he owed for the product that he had picked up the 
night before and that morning when he returned to Creasey's 
office in the afternoon, he would pay cash for the 
product he had purchased. (R-103) 
10. Steed, as well as all of the Lessees, 
(some 45 to 50 in number), (R-96) believed themselves to be 
independent contractors and in business for themselves. (R-
145) They kept and maintained their own books and 
records, (R-124); paid their own federal social security 
contributions and workmens compensation insurance (R-56, Ex 
10; made their own federal and state income tax payments, 
(R-125, 161, 175); paid all fuel and oil costs associated with 
the operation of the leased vehicles, (R-123, 174); owned the 
product purchased from Creasey and others; had the right to 
employ their own help (R-56, Ex 10, R-104, 136); decided when 
they wanted to take days off or vacations; and in so doing 
employed relief drivers at their own cost and expense (R-104); 
paid for any damage to the vehicle up to the deductible 
insurance that was paid by Creasey. (R-134, 135, 144, 311, 
Findings of Fact, ALJ) 
11. Steed, and the other Lessees, could vary 
their route if they so desired, but usually did not as in 
doing so they would not be able to serve their regular route 
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customers. They could, if they wanted tof service special 
events such as little league baseball games and other events. 
(R-137, Findings of Fact, ALJ R-312). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Respondent Steed was not performing 
services for a wage and therefore was not an employee within 
the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act of Utah. 
2. The Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah misapplied the Utah law in determining that the 
Respondent Steed was an employee within the meaning of the 
Unemployment Compensation Act of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE 
FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW BUT 
SHOULD NOT GIVE THOSE FINDINGS ANY UNEQUAL 
WEIGHT BASED UPON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
It is conceded that the findings of the Board of 
Review will be given weight on appeal, but they are subject 
to judicial review to assure that the findings fall within the 
"limits of reasonableness and rationality." Gay Hill Field 
Service v. Board of Review, 750 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1988); 
Barney v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1984). 
They will be, however, reviewed in a light most favorable to 
the agency's findings, Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 735 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1987), if the findings are 
supported by substantial evidence. Pinter Construction Company 
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v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984). Reaffirmed in McGuire v. 
Department of Employment Security, 101 Utah Adv Rep 62 (1989) , 
citing Covington v. Bd of Rev, of Indust. Com'm, 737 P.2d 207 
(Utah 1987). Absent such evidence, the findings of the Board 
should not be afforded any preferential treatment, or be 
sustained by the appellate court. 
As pointed out in Bennett v. Industrial Com'n of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986): 
"We do not defer to the Commission 
when construing statutory terms or 
when applying statutory terms to 
the facts unless the construction 
of the statutory language or the 
application of the law to the facts 
should be subject to the Commission's 
expertise gleaned from its accumulated 
practical, first hand expertise with 
the subject matter." 
The Court then went on and ruled: 
"Whether a worker is an employee 
within the meaning of the workmen's 
compensation laws requires the 
application of a statutory standard to 
the facts. Since resolution of the 
issue is not benefited by the 
Commission expertise or experience, we 
do not defer to the Commission's ruling." 
Thus, under the facts of the case now before the 
Court, while the Board of Review's decision should be noted, 
its decision does not merit an unequal weight with respect to 
the facts and evidence adduced in this matter in spite of the 
deference given the Employment Security Act by the law. 
Superior Cablevision v. Industrial Commission, 688 P.2d 444 
(Utah 1984) . 
POINT TWO 
THE STATUS OF AN INDIVIDUAL IS 
DETERMINED UPON THE FACTS OF EACH 
CASE 
It is submitted that each case must stand upon its 
own merit with respect to the status of individuals being 
either independent contractors or employees. Truck Insurance 
Exchange v. Yardley, 556 P.2d 494 (Utah 1976). 
POINT THREE 
STEED WAS NOT PERFORMING SERVICES 
FOR WAGES 
Before the tests enumerated in Utah Code Ann 35-4-
22(j)(5)/ commonly referred to as the ABC test (now the AB 
test) are applied, it must be determined under Utah Code 
Ann 35-4-22(j)(1) that Steed was in fact performing 
services for wages, or was under any contract of hire written 
or oral, express or implied. Blamires v. Board of Review, 
etc, 584 P.2d 889 (Utah 1978); Accord, Superior Cablevision v. 
Industrial Commission, 688 P.2d 444 (Utah 1984). 
It is submitted that the ALJ correctly applied 
the law in this regard, and it is conceded that the Review 
Board also deferred in ruling on the applicability of the 
AB test until after a determination was made as to the 
question of "wages" being paid, even though its decision 
took up the AB test applicability first. 
The ALJ found that Steed was not performing services 
for a wage, and therefore he was not an employee within the 
Unemployment Compensation Act, but upon appeal the Board of 
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Review found that Steed was working for wages by applying the 
criteria laid down in Creameries of America v. Industrial 
Commission, 98 Utah 571, 102 P.2d 300 (1940). The Board of 
Review failed to properly show the distinctions between 
Creameries and Fuller Brush Company v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201 (1940). 
The Board of Review in its decision stated: 
"In the instant case, claimant 
was permitted to charge a maximum 
amount for items sold to customers. 
The claimant could sell the items for 
less than the maximum price set but 
he was not permitted to exceed the set 
price." (R-292) 
Again the Board of Review held in its decision at 
R-295: 
"The maximum retail sales price was 
fixed by the Company." 
It is submitted that the Board of Review could only 
base such a finding on substantial competent evidence. 
Covington v. Bd of Rev, of Indus. Comfn, 737 P.2d 207 (Utah 
1987) . 
It reached the conclusion that "wages" were in fact 
being paid by Creasey because the Lessee could not raise or 
increase the price of the product being sold. This premise is 
completely fallacious and erroneous under the facts of this 
case based upon the testimony of the witnesses who testified 
before the ALJ. (Findings of Fact, R-312) 
The record demonstrates the errors in the Boardfs 
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findings. 
Steed testified on cross Examination: 
"Q. And is the reverse of that true, 
sir, if you decided that you wanted to 
increase the price on a particular 
product, you could do that? 
A. Yes." 
(R -134) 
Drollinger, a witness called by Steed who also had 
been a Lessee with Creasey for 13 years (R-155) testified on 
direct examination: 
"Q. Were you admonished for charging 
incorrect prices? 
A. Several times. 
Q. Can you be specific as to dates, places, 
times events? 
A. All during the years that I was there, 
I was admonished somewhat on—Nothing ever 
really came out of it, but I was, I was 
reminded that the prices were high." 
(R-157) 
On Cross Examination when going over the procedures 
for hiring a substitute driver, Drollinger testified: 
"Q. All right. Now, did you also tell 
him (the route supervisor) what to charge 
your customers, so he'd know what to 
collect? 
The Route supervisor was going to act, for a fee paid by 
Drollinger, as his substitute driver (R-163). 
A. He was aware of my higher prices and yes, 
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I told him if your in doubt, just add a 
nickel to it. 
Q. So, as a practical matter, you fixed 
the prices as to what you were going to get 
for the product that you were selling? 
A. I did, but I was harrassed about that. 
Q. Harrassed or not harrassed, you fixed 
the prices? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you collected your price? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And your profit was the difference 
between what you bought your product for--
A. Yes. 
Q.— and what you sold it for? and if you 
wanted to put in a price increase, you put 
in a price increase? 
A. Yes. I did." 
(R-164-165) 
This extra margin of profit went to the Lessee (R-293) and 
not inure to the benefit of Creasey in any way. 
Bowles, called as a witness by Creasey, a veteran 
Lessee with Creasey for over 20 years (R-169), testified 
with respect to pricing product in excess of that suggested 
by Creasey: 
"Q. Now, you've indicated that you furnished 
him (Route Supervisor) a price list. Do you 
change your price list from time to time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Increase or decrease what you may charge 
for a particular product? 
-11-
A. Yes, 
Q. Has Jim Creasey ever told you what to 
charge or what not to charge? 
A. No. It has been suggested, but I've 
never been told and not particulary 
harrassed. I don't know, maybe I don't 
harrass easy. 
(R-176) 
McDermaid, an in-house employee of Creasey 
for over 9 years (R-195), and a former Lessee (R-196) 
testified with respect to pricing: (R-200) 
"Q. Have you found on those routes that 
you have run different prices for the same 
product? 
A. Oh, yes. All the time. 
Q. Is that in fact rather common practice? 
A. Yes. I've seen marked items crossed out 
and different prices put on them." 
The only evidence adduced in this matter that 
indicated that Creasey would not permit any charges for 
product over that set by the company was in the direct 
testimony of Steed, but upon cross examination he admitted 
that the product was his to deal with as he saw fit (R-134) 
and that if he wanted to increase prices he could do it. 
He testified: (R-134) 
"Q. If you choose to reduce a price on 
a sandwich in order to get rid of it, 
I believe you've agreed with me you 
could do that, is that correct? 
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A. It'd be your decision, right. 
Q. And is the reverse of that true, sir? 
If you decided that you wanted to increase 
a price on a particular product, you could 
do that. 
A. Yes." 
As the Administrative Law Judge had the opportunity 
to view the witnesses and the Board of Review did not, it is 
submitted that the preponderance of evidence in this matter 
was, as found by the ALJ, that Creasey did not control the 
maximum price that could be charged for products sold by the 
Lessees. 
The standard of proof that must be applied in these 
matters is a preponderance of evidence, Lucker Sand & Gravel 
v. Industrial Comm., 82 Utah 188, 23 P. 2d 225 (1933); 
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 
136 (1946), which must reach the elevated standard of being 
"substantial." McGuire v. Department of Employment Security, 
101 Utah Adv Rep 62 (Utah App., Feb. 1989). 
The two cases that must be looked to with respect to 
the question of a "contract of hire" or of "wages" , under the 
facts of this case are Fuller Brush, supra, and Singer Sewing 
Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 175, 134 P.2d 
479 (1943). It is submitted that Fuller Brush is, factually, 
on all fours with the facts of the case now before the court, 
as was found by the ALJ. 
In Singer, it is pointed out that the right to 
determine and fix the compensation of the worker is indictive 
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of the relationship between the worker and employer. See also: 
Harry L Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975) 
In the instant case the evidence clearly showed 
that the amount of compensation earned by the Lessee 
directly hinged upon his abilities in selling his product; the 
hours he was willing to work; the number of stops that 
he was willing to make; and the prices that he charged for the 
product, which could be more than that recommended, or could 
be less, at the Lessee's discretion. While there were 
suggested ceilings and floors, these were advisory only and 
did not result in termination of the equipment lease. 
In Fuller Brush, the Utah court laid out guide 
lines and definitions that have stood the test of time. 
Justice Larson stated in the majority opinion that: 
"The essential elements of wages 
are that they form a direct obligation 
against the employer, in favor of the 
employee; that when the service is 
performed the compensation, if any, 
accrues and becomes payable regardless 
of the success or failure of the 
undertaking; that any profits or earnings 
over and above costs of the service 
accrues to the employer and any loss as 
a result of the undertaking or service 
must be borne by the employer." (p.204 of 
Pacific citation) 
Under the facts of the case now before the Court 
the elements laid out in Fuller Brush cannot be met in 
finding that Steed was paid a wage. 
Creasey was paid his lease rentals, up front, 
regardless of whether the Lessee sold anything at all. The 
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Lessee had the product, and he could do with it what he 
wanted, but Creasey did not take anything back and Creasey was 
paid, not on what the product sold for from the truck, but on 
what the Lessee paid Creasey, or others, for the product. 
The "profits and earnings" over and above the cost 
spelled out by Fuller Brush, became the property of the Lessee 
and not of the alleged employer, Creasey. The Lessee could 
charge anything he wanted, but Creasey did not get the 
wind-fall of a higher than normal return on the sale of 
product. 
If there was a loss from the non sale of perishables, 
that loss fell on the Lessee, (R-132) not Creasey. (R-293) 
If product did not sell, the Lessee got nothing, but 
was in fact out his investment in his product. Creasey still 
got his lease payments on the truck. 
Any credit advances to the customer were the sole 
responsibility of Lessee and the loss, or gain, was his. 
(R-133) 
Justice Larson pointed out in Fuller Brush, that all 
of the elements pointed out in Creameries of America were 
lacking under the facts of Fuller Brush, and it is submitted 
that Fuller Brush and the case now before the Court are almost 
identical as to the methods employed by lessee in the sale of 
product and the commission sales persons selling brushes in 
Fuller Brush. 
It is respectfully submitted that the ALJ was correct 
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in applying Fuller Brush, and it is respectfully submitted 
that the Board of Review was in error in applying Creameries 
of America, and rejecting the reasoning of Fuller Brush. 
It is to be noted that under Utah Code Ann 35-4-
22(j)(1) it must be found that the Claimant was in fact 
performing services for wages, or was under any contract of 
hire written or oral, express or implied with the alleged 
employer before a person is deemed to be an employee for 
unemployment compensation purposes. 
The latter phrase "or was under any contract of hire 
written or oral, express or implied" was not found by the 
Board of Review. The Respondents have not asserted that such a 
relationship existed at time of the hearings in this matter, 
therefore, the Petitioner will not further address that 
question in this brief. 
The Board of Review went into an extensive 
examination of what it thought the evidence showed with 
respect to whether or not "wages" were being paid. 
It reached the conclusion that "wages" were in fact 
being paid by Creasey because Steed could not raise or 
increase the price of the product being sold. 
This is in direct opposition to the reasoning and 
conclusions of law found by the ALJ (R-313, 314) and the facts 
adduced during the hearing. 
As pointed out above, Steed could and did increase 
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prices, lower prices, give product away, and in short deal 
with the product as his own, to do with as he saw fit. 
The Board's finding of fact that wages that were 
paid is reversible error. 
POINT FOUR 
ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH EMPLOYMENT 
The Board of Review relied heavily upon the case 
of Creameries of America, supra, in reaching its decision that 
Steed was an employee, and pointed out (R-295), that most 
of the elements of Creameries of America, were present in the 
instant case. 
In the case of New Sleep, Inc., v. Department of 
Employment Sec., 703 P.2d 289, (Utah 1985) the Supreme Court 
laid down elements or factors which should be considered. 
However, not all need be present. Ellison, Inc. v. Board of 
Review, 749 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1988). Reaffirmed in McGuire 
v. Department of Employment Security, 101 Utah Adv Rep 62 
(1989) . 
Utah has adopted the Restatement of Law, Agency, 1st 
and 2nd § 220 and the various factors spelled out in this 
work as those which are to be considered, in determining 
whether a person is an employee or not. Christean v. 
Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948); 
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comfn, 562 P.2d 227 (Utah, 1977). 
Various elements or factors will be discussed 
hereafter, which are not necessarily specifically those 
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pointed out in Creameries of America, or Fuller Brush. 
PRODUCT HANDLED: 
In Creameries of America the element of exclusivity 
of product was used as one of the factors in determining 
whether wages were being paid and thus the status of an 
employee existed. 
The Review Board found that the Lessees from a 
practical matter were substantially limited in handling 
product other than that sold by the Company, because of the 
termination provision of the contract. (R-295) It is 
submitted that this was mere supposition on the part of the 
Board which ran directly contrary to the testimony of the 
witnesses, none of whom had been discharged for such 
practices. 
The testimony in this matter showed that the 
Lessee could handle any product he wanted (Bowles R-171) 
Littlefield, R-224, 226) the only restriction being, 
however, that Creasey be paid 13% of the purchase price 
(R-224) of such product bought from others as part of the 
lease rental for the truck, which was admitted to be fair by 
the Lessees (R-130) 
CONTROL OR RIGHT OF CONTROL: 
Much time and many cases have turned upon the issue 
of control or the right of control in making a determination 
as to whether or not an individual is an employee under the 
statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann 35-4-22. 
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Many cases hold that the determinative factor is 
not "control11 which establishes the differentiation between 
that of an independent contractor and employee but it is the 
"right of control" that governs. However, Utah cases still 
speak of control as being one of the factors that has to be 
considered. 
The amount of control exercised must be 
"comparatively" high over the person performing the required 
duties. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 
318 (Utah 1975). 
While control or the right of control is one of the 
"most" important elements in determining the employee or 
independent contactor relationship, it cannot be used, 
seperate and apart from all of the other factors used to 
make that determination. Sutton v. Industrial Commission, 
9 Utah 2d 309, 344 P.2d 538 (1959). 
DESIRED RESULT: 
One of the means of determining whether a person is 
an independent- contractor or an employee is to apply a test 
to determine what the employer wishes to accomplish as opposed 
to the method or means that must be employed to reach that 
desired result. Thus, if the employer has the right to 
dictate the method and means by which the employee is to carry 
out his duties to reach the desired result, then he is an 
employee, but if the employer tells the person what the end 
result is to be after that person has performed his duties, 
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then he is an independent contractor. North American Bldrs, 
Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. P., 22 Utah 2d 338, 453 P.2d 142 
(1969) . 
The Supreme Court in Parkinson v. Industrial 
Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946) Stated: 
"Anyone employing an independent 
contractor, such as a plumber or 
a building contractor, has the right 
to determine where he wants the work 
to be done. It is when the employer 
can not only determine where the work 
shall be done, but how it should be 
executed that the relationship is 
that of employer-employee." 
In the case now before the Court there was no 
evidence showing that Creasey dictated how the product 
was to be sold. There was nothing in the evidence that set 
quotas that the Lessees had to meet. The only thing that was 
shown was that the Lessees were to carry a minimum of product, 
but whether they sold it or not, was solely up to them. As 
Creasey was paid its lease rentals based upon product 
purchased for sale by the Lessees, Creasey was interested in 
the minimum amount of product purchased by the Lessee. But 
whether Lessee sold the product was of no moment to Creasey, 
as the responsibility to pay the lease rentals was incurred by 
the Lessee at the time that he acquired the product from 
Creasey. 
The methods by which Lessees sold the product were 
theirs. Admittedly, Creasey would make suggestions as to 
marketing techniques, but these were not demands, but merely 
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suggestions. 
HOURS; 
This matter could be construed as part of control 
or right of control, but for the purposes of this brief it 
shall be addressed independently. 
With respect to the number of hours that the Lessee 
worked, this was left solely up to each individual. 
Bowles testified: (R-172-173) 
"Q. Do you control your own hours then in 
accordance with what you then percieve to be 
the needs of your customers? 
A. Yes. 
McDermaid, one of the route supervisors, 
testified: (R-205) 
flQ. In your day-to-day supervision of the 
number of routes that you sort of have 
responsibilities for, sir, have you ever 
told a driver, a route licensee, what time 
he or she had to come to work? 
A. No. 
Q. Ever told them how many hours they had 
to work? 
A. No. 
Q. Ever told them what time they had to be 
back to Creasey Catering? 
A. No. 
INTENT : 
The Intent of the parties is one of the "most" 
important factors to be considered in determining the 
status of the parties. Christean v. Industrial Commission, 
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113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948); Sutton v. Industrial 
Commission, 9 Utah 2d 309, 344 P.2d 538 (1959); Rustler 
Lodge v. Industrial Com'n, 562 P.2d 227 (Utah 1977); 
Restatement of The Law, Agency, 2nd, § 220; Restatement of 
The Law, Agency, 1st, § 22 0. 
The parties contracted with one another on the 
basis that the relationship was that of an independent 
contractor-employer basis (Exhibit 10, R-40, para 13). 
Mr. Steed thought that he was an independent 
contractor for over 18 years, (R-145) as did the other 
witnesses who testified before the ALJ. 
It is acknowledged that the written intent of the 
parties is ineffective to circumvent the unemployment 
compensation act if the actions of the individual brings 
himself under the act, Superior Cablevision v. Industrial 
Com'n, 688 P.2d 444, 447 (Utah 1984,) and cases cited 
therein, but the actions of Creasey have not brought it 
within the scope of the act. 
CUSTOMERS: 
The status of customers was explored in Creameries 
of America. It is submitted that there are few similiarities 
between the instant case and Creameries of America. 
The testimony of the witnesses established that the 
customers were the customers of the individiual Lessee and 
that the Lessee could and did solicit new business. (R-93) 
Drollinger, a witness for Steed testified: 
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"Q. Okay. And did you solicit customers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Successfully? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you keep them yourself? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All of them? 
A. Pretty well, I would say. 
Q. Did you loose customers that had been on 
a route that you started to another driver? 
A. Not without my okay on it. 
(R-162) 
BUSINESS LICENSE : 
Under the present status of Utah cases this element 
would seem to have little real impact on the status of the 
individual anymore. 
Steed denied having any business licenses after 1974 
(R-128-129) or a tobacco license, although paragraph 13 of the 
License Agreement (Exhibit 10, R-40, para 13) required him to 
have one. 
Bowles, a witness for Creasey testified that he had a 
Tobacco License for many years. (R-183) 
Steed admitted having collected, under a sales tax 
license, Utah sales tax but gave that up when he fell behind 
and was caught by the State Tax Commission (R-lll, 129), 
and from that point forward he allowed Creasey to collect and 
remit the sales tax for him. That was also true of the Steed's 
-23-
only witness, Drollinger. (R-156) 
In Barney v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 681 P. 2d 
682 (Utah 1984), the Court said in the decision: 
"Nor does the existence of a license 
determine the independent nature of a 
trade, there being no evidence in this 
case of a distinction between a specialist 
who holds a license and one who does not." 
In McGuire v. Department of Employment Security, 101 Utah Adv 
62 (Utah App., Feb. 1989) the Court of Appeals pointed out 
that even having a license was not dispositive of the 
independent nature of a persons business. 
SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT IN TOOLS OR EQUIPMENT 
NECESSARY TO DO THE WORK: 
This factor is heavily stressed in the Restatement as 
well as in Creameries of America. 
While it is true that the trucks belonged to Creasey 
it is also true that each truck was under a lease agreement to 
each of the Lessees, including Steed, and as such this 
constitutes a substantial investment in tools necessary to do 
the work. Lessee was required to invest in other tools such as 
a money changer and his inventory. 
There is nothing in the law that requires one to own 
outright the tools of his trade. From a practical matter, 
many businesses as well as other independent contractors do 
not own their own tools outright, but lease them, or are 
buying them on time under a security agreement or mortgage. 
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The following matters are not directly pointed out 
as seperate elements but their impact must be considered in 
establishing the relationship between the parties. 
SEPERATE BOOKS OF RECORD AND ACCOUNTS; 
The Lessees kept their own books and records. 
(R-124) 
ACCOUNT TO EMPLOYER FOR PROFITS AND LOSSES: 
The Lessees kept their profits and were responsible 
for their own losses. (R-124, 134, 157) They did not account 
to Creasey. 
ACCOUNT TO EMPLOYER FOR THE COST OF GAS, OIL AND OTHER 
EXPENSES OF THE LEASED TRUCK: 
Under the facts of this case the Lessee was 
responsible to purchase the gas and oil, (R-123) and the 
cost was not borne by Creasey. (R-123) Lessee was 
responsible for the payment of the deductible physical 
vehicle damage. 
SOLICITING NEW BUSINESS: 
As previously pointed out above, the Lessee had the 
right to solicit new business. 
CHARGING PRICES WITHOUT CREASEY1S CONSENT: 
As previously pointed out above, the Lessee had the 
right to charge such prices as he wanted, although he was 
encouraged by Creasey to follow Creaseyfs lead as to a ceiling 
on pricing. 
RISK OF LOSS: 
The risk of loss to the Lessee occured, under the 
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facts of this case, when the Lessee purchased product as it 
became his product. (R-132) 
EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER PERSONNEL BY LESSEE; 
Under the facts of this case the Lessee had the right 
to perform the services under the contract in person or to 
employ others, at his own cost, to perform the services being 
rendered for him. 
Steed1s counsel stipulated that: (R-222) 
"And I think we can stipulate 
that there are employees of the 
drivers, whether they are loaders 
or other persons helping in the 
driver!s task at Creasey, . . . " 
Creaseyfs counsel then stated: (R-222) 
"I want there to be a clear showing 
on this record, and I assume we might 
accomplish that by stipulation, Mr. 
Wharton, that the route licensees are 
free to, and in many instances, do 
employ their own personnel, for 
whatever purpose. 
MR. WHARTON: Oh, I think we stipulate 
to that." 
PAYMENT OF LESSEE FOR SERVICES RENDERED: 
In the instant case, as has been shown above, the 
Lessee is not paid by Creasey but gained his income from sales 
to his customers. Fuller Brush, supra. This is a factor that 
must be looked at to determine the true status of the 
relationship between the parties. Harry L Young & Sons, Inc. 
v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975). 
TERMINATION RIGHTS: 
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In the instant case, either party had the right to 
terminate their association with one another without the 
incurring of any liability, except for any outstanding debts. 
This is another factor that has to be considered in 
determining the status of the parties. Harry L. Young & Sons 
v. Ashton, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the question of 
whether Creasey met the AB test need not be addressed as the 
question of Steed being paid a "wage" is dispositive in this 
case. 
The Board of Review committed reversible error in 
ruling that the facts of the instant case brought it under 
Creameries of America instead of Fuller Brush. 
To get the instant case under Creameries of America 
the Board of Review made an error of fact that the maximum 
amount that could be charged by Steed and the other Lessees 
was totally and completely controlled by Creasey, while the 
facts showed to the contrary. 
While this is but one element which must be 
considered, it was the element upon which the Board of Review 
predicated its decision that Steed was in fact earning a 
wage, and thus an employee under the Unemployment Compensation 
Act of Utah. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Administrative 
Law Judge correctly applied the facts and law in this case and 
his decision should be reaffirmed by the Court and the Board 
of Review's decision reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 35-4-22 
(1) All individuals performing services within this state for any em-
ploying unit which maintains two or more separate establishments 
within this state are considered to be performing services for a single 
employing unit for all the purposes of this chapter. 
(2) Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing the 
work of any person in the service of an employing unit is considered to be 
engaged by the employing unit for all the purposes of this chapter 
whether the individual was hired or paid directly by the employing unit 
or by the person, provided the employing unit had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the work. 
(3) "Hospital" means an institution which is licensed, certified, or ap-
proved by the Department of Health as a hospital. 
(4) (A) "Institution of higher education," for the purposes of this sec-
tion, means an educational institution which: 
(i) admits, as regular students only, individuals having a cer-
tificate of graduation from a high school, or the recognized equiv-
alent of a certificate; 
(ii) is legally authorized in this state to provide a program of 
education beyond high school; 
(iii) provides an educational program for which it awards a 
bachelor's or higher degree, or provides a program which is ac-
ceptable for full credit toward that degree, a program of post-
graduate or post-doctoral studies, or a program of training to 
prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupa-
tion; and 
(iv) is a public or other nonprofit institution. 
(B) All colleges and universities in this state are institutions of 
higher education for purposes of this section, 
(i) "Employer" means: 
(1) Any employing unit which paid wages during a calendar quarter in 
either the current or preceding calendar year for employment amounting 
to $140 or more and any employing unit subject to the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act, or which, as a condition for approval of this chapter for full 
tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act, is required, under the act, to be an employer. 
(2) Any employing unit which, having become an employer under Sub-
section (1), has not, under Sections 35-4-5 and 35-4-8, ceased to be an 
employer subject to this chapter; or, 
(3) For the effective period of its election under Subsection 35-4-8(c) 
any other employing unit which has elected to become fully subject to this 
chapter. 
(j) (1) "Employment" means any service performed prior to January 1, 
1972, which was employment as defined in the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law prior to the effective date of this chapter, and subject 
to the other provisions of this subsection, service performed after Decem-
ber 31, 1971, including service in interstate commerce, and service as an 
officer of a corporation performed for wages or under any contract of hire 
written or oral, express or implied. 
(2) "Employment" includes an individual's entire service performed 
within or both within and without this state if any of the following Sub-
paragraphs (A) through (K) is satisfied: 
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(A) the service is performed entirely within the state; or 
(B) the service is performed both within and without the state, but 
the service performed without the state is incidental to the individ-
ual's service within the state, for example, is temporary or transitory 
in nature or consists of isolated transactions. 
(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any con-
tract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are considered to be 
employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the commission that: 
(A) the individual has been and will continue to be free from con-
trol or direction over the performance of those services, both under 
his contract of hire and in fact; and 
(B) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently es-
tablished trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same na-
ture as that involved in the contract of service. 
(6) Provided that the services are also exempted under the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, as amended, "employment" shall not include: 
(A) service performed: 
(i) prior to January 1, 1973, in the employ of a state, except as 
provided in Subsection 35-4-22(j)(2)(D); or 
(ii) in the employ of a political subdivision of a state, except as 
provided in Subsection 35-4-22fj)(2)(D); 
(B) service performed in the employ of the United States Govern-
ment or an instrumentality of the United States immune under the 
Constitution of the United States from the contributions imposed by 
this chapter, except that, to the extent that the Congress of the 
United States shall permit, this chapter shall apply to those instru-
mentalities and to services performed for the instrumentalities to the 
same extent as to all other employers, employing units, individuals 
and services; provided, that if this state is not certified for any year 
by the secretary of labor under Section 3304 of the Federal Internal 
Revenue Code, the payments required of the instrumentalities with 
respect to that year shall be refunded by the commission from the 
fund in the same manner and within the same period as is provided 
in Subsection 35-4-7(d) with respect to contributions erroneously col-
lected; 
(C) service performed after June 30, 1939, as an employee repre-
sentative as defined in the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act 
(52 Stat. 1094), and service performed after June 30, 1939, for an 
employer as defined in that act except that if the commission deter-
mines that any employing unit which is principally engaged in activ-
ities not included in those definitions constitutes such an employer 
only to the extent of an identifiable and separable portion of its activ-
ities, this exemption applies only to services performed for the identi-
fiable and separable portion of its activities; 
(D) agricultural labor as defined in Subparagraph (8) of this sub-
section, except as provided in Subsection 35-4-22(j)(2)(J); 
(E) domestic service in a private home, local college club, or local 
chapter of a college fraternity or sorority, except as provided in Sub-
section 35-4-22(j)(2)(K); 
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WHO IS A SERVANT 
§ 2 2 0 . Definition of Servant 
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services 
in the affairs of another and who with respect to the 
physical conduct in the performance of the services is 
subject to the other's control or right to control. 
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is 
a servant or an independent contractor, the following 
matters of fact, among others, are considered: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, 
the master may exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a 
distinct occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, 
in the locality, the work is usually done under the direc-
tion of the employer or by a specialist without supervi-
sion; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies 
the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the 
person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is em-
ployed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or 
by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular 
business of the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creat-
ing the relation of master and sen ant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 
